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Analysis of the Present Situation
of the Basic Intelligence Course, with Particular
Regard to the Report of the Career Service Committee

I. Course Objective: development of professional understanding.

A. Established

1. Understanding

The CSC Report (Tab E, 1, a and b) calls for:
"... an adequate basic intelligence background."
"... a broad yet intensive intelligence training."

2. Professional

- a. The Intelligence School has been closely geared to a career program from its start.
- b. The CSC Report repeatedly refers to "professional positions."
- c. Current recommendations seek to define "professional" in terms of connection with substantive intelligence work and distinction from narrow specializations like clerical.

B. Eliminated

1. Orientation

- a. A superficial survey does not fit with the CSC Report's emphasis upon professional understanding.
- b. The staff of the Course knows the program has been criticized as chiefly orientation and is trying to remove such basis as there may be for this criticism.

2. Specialized skill development

- a. The CSC Report (Tab E, 1, b) rules it out:
"Specialized training, including language, area, and operational training, will be handled in other parts of the training program."
- b. The only specialized skill thus far included was language; it has been cut out.

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- c. The only other skill included is reading; improvement in it is generally useful, not specialized.

3. Selection and Placement

- a. The CSC Report relieves OTR of most of the role it has played in these matters.
- b. If the staff of the Basic Intelligence Course gets any responsibility in connection with placement, it will be by request of the Professional Selection Panel.

II. Students: substantial increase from changing sources.

A. Pattern of employment is changing drastically.

- 1. Career Corps, hired against OTR slots, has provided bulk of students to date.
- 2. CSC Report (Tab E, p.2, fa) specifies:
"All recruitment will be undertaken against authorized slots in consumer Offices except ..." for a few to accommodate draft-eligibles.
- 3. CSC Report repeatedly uses such phrases as: "all personnel for professional positions" in connection with indicating who should take the BIC.

B. Number of students probably will increase substantially.

- 1. Those in OTR slots, at least for present, will be reduced to:
 - a. Persons in the Junior Officers Training Program, prior to their going to external colleges, etc.
 - b. Draft-eligibles prior to their entering Armed Services.
- 2. But those in other slots will probably increase substantially.
 - a. They should include all new recruits for professional jobs in the DD/I Offices and the DD/A Staff.

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- b. The CSC Report also specifies (Tab E, 1) that they should include "overt personnel assigned to covert Offices" though present recommendations by OTR leave this matter largely to the discretion of the covert Offices.

C. Precise numbers will not be known for several weeks.

1. An off-hand guess by representatives of Personnel puts the number at about one hundred per month.
2. More dependable estimates must await:
 - a. Approval of the definition of "professional" that is now in process.
 - b. Consultations by Personnel with the AD's to get their views on "professional" and their estimates of recruitment needs.
 - c. Official estimates by Personnel of prospective trainees.

III. Course Content: evolution rather than revolution.

A. General character can continue along present lines.

1. CSC Report (Tab E, 1, b) seems to recommend that the program "be reoriented" and expanded as speedily as possible...."
2. But this evidently reflects a misconception, for:
 - a. This passage opens with an error: "The present Professional Training Program in the CIA Intelligence School...."
 - b. The objective of this change is substantially that of the present course: "to give ... a broad yet intensive intelligence training."

B. Details, however, must be adapted:

1. To comply as fully as possible with the accepted objective. (No course ever does so completely.)
2. To comply with the CSC Report: further recommendation (Tab E, 1, c) that "the curriculum of the CIA Intelligence School, including recommended reading, be revised to cover subjects of particular interest to Offices and be coordinated with TR(S) to reduce duplication in the curricula."

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IV. Course methods: closely dependent upon other factors.

A. Present methods, which are generally satisfactory for present operations, include:

1. Lectures. These are relied upon almost exclusively for the presentation of the information and ideas that constitute the real nub of the course.
 - a. Some are by regular members of the staff.
 - b. Many are by visitors.
2. Readings. While these are well integrated into a system of oral reports by students, they are essentially supplementary. Reading is very little used either to present basic information and ideas or directly to fortify lecture presentations of such material. Chief reason for this omission doubtless is the scarcity of suitable reading matter. Some progress is being made toward the development of this general type of material, but it has not thus far become a major project. Analogy with availability and use of textbooks and reference books in colleges and graduate schools and of field and training manuals in the Armed Services suggests that here is a major instructional avenue that should be vigorously exploited.
3. Current Area Analyses. These are student projects based largely upon the regular reading of several newspapers. They are informative and supply a practical introduction to some of the problems of collecting, correlating, and interpreting information.
4. Discussion. Ordinarily, each lecture, book report, or area analysis is followed by at least brief discussion. Most of these periods are very useful.
5. Training Aids. No films are used. Slides or charts are used occasionally, but of these most are provided by visiting lecturers. (Very poor auditory security in the present quarters precludes use of sound films or amplification devices.)

B. The possibilities of various methods of instruction are closely dependent upon combinations of such factors as number of students, timing of the course, staff, and facilities, e.g.:

1. More students in the same type of facilities would preclude use of visiting speakers because of limited auditory security and the fact that visitors cannot be expected to

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address two or more sections of the same course.

2. More students with the same number of staff members would reduce the possibilities of discussion, personal contacts, and individual or small-group projects.
3. The shorter the duration of the course, the less is the use that can be made of supplementary readings, area analyses, or other individual group projects.
4. If two classes are run concurrently without approximately doubling staff and facilities, most discussion, personal contact, and projects will have to be eliminated.

V. Timing of the Course: affects content, methods, staff, facilities.

- A. The last running of the course was fourteen weeks. With language eliminated, the next running will be six weeks. This cut is more than would be proportionate to the elimination of the language.
 1. It results in the elimination of some material that could be called fat.
 2. It leaves no free room for the building up of muscle or the addition of new muscle.
- B. Six weeks may be the saturation point, below which the amount of material necessary for this course would come at the student so fast that it could not be absorbed.
- C. Timing is intimately tied in with possible changes in numbers of students, course content and methods, staff and facilities.

VI. Facilities: hardly adaptable to expansion or such change.

A. Present facilities are:

- 1 student workroom -- capacity about 15.
- 1 classroom -- capacity about 35-40
- 2 group offices -- for all staff except chief instructor
- 1 private office -- for chief instructor

B. These facilities are now at or close to maximum feasible use.

- C. Only if OTR got the first floor also and if air conditioning were provided could these facilities be adapted to a greatly increased enrollment or to a very different type of operation.

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1. Limitations of auditory security through both floors and windows prevent either the use of sound films or lectures to much larger groups of students.
2. Arrangement of space and lack of air conditioning combine to preclude construction of smaller offices, which would add to instructor efficiency and facilitate conferences between instructors and students.

VII. Staff: sufficiently flexible to await other decisions.

A. Present staff includes:

- 2 regular instructors -- CIA personnel
- 3 loan instructors -- assigned by Army, Navy, State
- 1 chief instructor -- now doubling as Division Head
- 1 training assistant
- 2 secretaries

B. This staff is fairly adequate for present size and type of operation.

C. Significant increase in enrollment would necessitate either more staff or less discussion, personal contacts, and small-scale projects.

D. There is flexibility in the fact that operating methods could be modified temporarily to permit the handling of more students with the same staff.

E. Ultimate staff needs depend upon decisions as to enrollment, timing, content, methods, etc.

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